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RETALIATION AGAINST THIRD PARTIES: A
POTENTIAL LOOPHOLE IN TITLE VII'S
DISCRIMINATION PROTECTION
ANITA

G. SCHAUSTEN*

Should the sins of the father be visited upon the son?' Or, for
that matter, should the sins of the husband be visited upon the
wife or the sins of a friend upon another friend? When one
employee suffers an adverse employment action as a result of the
protected activity of another, should there be a cause of action for
the employee that did not engage in the protected activity? For
example, if a mother and daughter both work for the same
company and the mother engages in a protected activity, such as
filing a charge of discrimination, should the daughter have a cause
of action against the company if she is subsequently fired in
retaliation for her mother's claim?
This is the question that courts must address in third party
employment retaliation cases. Currently, courts are split on the
issue. The courts that allow the claims do so on the basis that it
comports with the purpose of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. 3 Other courts do not allow the claims on the basis that the
plain language of Title VII does not support it.'
This comment will address the split on this issue and propose
that third-party claims are permissible. Part I will provide a brief
background on Title VII. It will also review the elements of a
prima facie retaliation claim and the problems associated with a
third-party claim. Part II will discuss the major cases on third

* Juris Doctor candidate, January 2005.
1. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing
EURIPIDES, PHRIXUS, frag. 970; HORACE, ODES III, 6:1; WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 3, sc. 5).
2. Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain
Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63 MO. L. REV. 115, 130 (1998).
The
commentators contend that besides issues concerning what constitutes an
adverse employment action, "there is no more uncertain area of the case law
on retaliation than that of retaliation against employees who work in the same
workplace as spouses, relatives, or other closely related third parties who have

themselves engaged in protected conduct." Id.
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d
541, 545-46 (6th Cir. 1993).

4. Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998).
1313
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party retaliation, focusing on the reasoning behind the holding in
each case. Finally, Part III will propose that the purpose of Title
VII is best served by adopting a broad interpretation of the
statutory language to include retaliation claims by third parties.
I.

TITLE VII: PUTTING AN END TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
AND ASSOCIATED RETALIATION

A. Overview and Purpose of Title VII
President John F. Kennedy sent a proposed civil rights bill to
Congress at a time of great civil unrest' for the purpose of ending
racial discrimination in places of public accommodation. 6 As the
acrimonious and sometimes violent battle7 to end discrimination
wore on, congressional proponents of the bill amended it to add
protection for equal opportunity in employment for minorities
and, eventually, for women.9 This bill became the 1964 Civil
Rights Act; Title VIVO of this bill deals with employment
discrimination."
Title VII currently makes it unlawful to discriminate against
an employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin. 2 It also contains a provision prohibiting retaliation by an

5. ROBERT D. LOEVY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 19, 38-40 (1997). In
the book, the author states that "[ilt
can be said of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
that, short of a declaration of war, no other act of Congress had a more violent
background - a background of confrontation, official violence, injury, and
murder that has few parallels in American history." Id. at 40.
6. Id. at 38-42.
7. Id. at 39-42. After the first two black students registered for classes at
the University of Alabama in 1963, President Kennedy addressed the nation,
stating that "'[the fires of frustration and discord are burning in every city,
North and South, where legal remedies are not at hand .... Next week I shall
ask the Congress ... to make a commitment.., to the proposition that race
has no place in American life or law.'" Id. at 353.
8. Id. at 334, 355-56.
9. Id. at 357. See 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION (MB) § 2.05 (2003) (providing a history of discrimination,
including the fact that "for most of the history of American law courts at all
levels accepted the constitutionality of discrimination based on sex"). These
amendments regarding employment became the basis for Title VII, Equal
Employment Opportunity, which prohibits discrimination in employment
based on several enumerated factors and set up the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").
CHARLES W. WHALEN & BARBARA
WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE 241 (1985).
10. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
11. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 9, at 241.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. An unlawful employment practice consists of
"fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. The Act is applicable to employers
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employer against employees who file discrimination charges or
otherwise engage in protected activity. 13 The statute states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment... because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any14manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.
A retaliation claim is a separate claim and may proceed even if the
underlying discrimination claim fails.15
To sustain a claim of retaliation, an employee must first
establish a prima facie case by establishing three elements: (1)
that he engaged in protected activity; (2) that the employer took
an adverse employment action against him; and (3) that there was
a causal connection between his engaging in protected activity and
the adverse employment action." In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 7 the Supreme Court set forth the framework for analyzing
a retaliation claim and the accompanying burden-shifting of
proof." Under this framework, employees must first establish
having fifteen or more employees. Id. § 2000. The procedure for filing a
complaint is set forth in the statute and requires that an aggrieved employee
first file with the EEOC before bringing a charge in a court of law. Id.
§ 2000e-5.
13. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
14. Id.
15. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL 8-2

(1998)

[hereinafter

EEOC

COMPLIANCE

MANUAL],

http'//www.eeoc.gov/

docslretal.pdf.
16. Smith, 151 F.3d at 818; Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702,
705 (5th Cir. 1997). But see Stone v. Indianapolis Pub. Util. Div., 281 F.3d
640, 644 (7th Cir. 2000) (changing the traditional prima facie case for
retaliation to include the same elements used for discrimination).
17. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
18. Id. at 802-05. In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court established
that a plaintiff must first show a prima facie case of racial discrimination by
showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the defendant to show some "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for not
hiring the employee. Id. Once the defendant comes forward with such
information, the burden then shifts back to plaintiff to show that the reason
given by the defendant is pretextual. Id. at 804-05. This rule was then
clarified

in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.

Burdine by

emphasizing that the burden of persuasion regarding discrimination remains
on the plaintiff at all times. 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). This same burdenshifting analysis is applied to retaliation claims. Contreras v. Suncast Corp.,
237 F.3d 756, 759-60 (7th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d
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their prima facie case. 9 If they are able to do so, the burden then
shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action." If the employer offers
such a reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that
the offered reason is actually a pretext for retaliation.21
B. PrimaFacie Retaliation Case
1.

ProtectedActivity

Title VII provides two basic types of protected activity:
opposing unlawful practices and assisting or participating in the
process.2 While it is well settled that an employee may bring a
retaliation claim based on participation, whether or not the
underlying charge is meritorious, this is not the case under the
opposition clause. 3 Some courts do not allow a retaliation claim
based on opposition unless the plaintiff is actually able to prove
discrimination. 4 Most courts, however, hold that employees may
bring a claim regardless of the merits of the underlying case as
long as they have a reasonable belief in the claim. 5
858, 862 (6th Cir. 1997); Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir.
1996). However, where there is direct evidence, the burden-shifting analysis
of McDonnell Douglas is not necessary. Stone, 281 F.3d at 643; EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 15, at 8-16.
19. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir. 1997).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1209 (E.D. Cal.
1998).
23. See Jeffries v. Kan. Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 147 F.3d 1220, 1231
(10th Cir. 1998) (stating that a "plaintiff may maintain an action for
retaliation based on participation ... regardless of whether the conduct
forming the basis of her underlying complaint is adjudged to violate Title
VII"); 1 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS LITIGATION: PLEADING AND PRACTICE (MB)
§ 2.02[61(a) (2002) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE RIGHTS LITIGATION].
But see
Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1454-55 (11th Cir. 1998)
(holding that because the plaintiff showed a reasonable basis for filing a
retaliation claim, the court need not decide if a retaliation claim based on the
participation clause must show a reasonable, good-faith basis).
24. EMPLOYEE RIGHTS LITIGATION, supra note 23, § 2.02[6](a) (citing EEOC
v. C&D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300 (M.D. Ga. 1975)).
25. Wyatt v. Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting 3 ARTHUR
LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 87.12(b) (1994)
that "there is nothing in [the statute's] wording requiring that the charges be
valid, nor even an implied requirement that they be reasonable"); Dey v. Colt
Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1458 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that an
employee may bring a retaliation case even though the challenged activity did
not actually violate Title VII as long as there was a reasonable, good-faith
belief); EMPLOYEE RIGHTS LITIGATION, supra note 23, § 2.02[6](a). The
Supreme Court recently declined to rule on the Ninth Circuit's holding that a
cause of action for retaliation extends to claims that the employee "could
reasonably believe were unlawful." Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532
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A protected activity generally includes filing a charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,26 threatening to
file a charge27 or discussing a potential charge with an EEOC
counselor prior to actually filing a complaint." It can also include
refusing to obey orders thought to be discriminatory. 9 However,
an informal complaint to a supervisor without any specific
allegations of discrimination is generally not sufficient. 9
Although Title VII only specifically includes employees and
applicants for employment,31 the Supreme Court ruled that the
term "employee" also extends to former employees.23 The Court
explained that the more inclusive definition is consistent with the
broader context of Title VII and its purpose.'

U.S. 268, 270 (2001). The case involved an underlying claim of sexual
harassment based on a single incident of an ambiguous remark. Id. at 269-71.
The Court concluded that there was no occasion to rule because, in the
particular case, "no one could reasonably believe that the incident.., violated
Title VII." Id. at 270.
26. Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 440-41, (7th Cir. 1996); Jones v.
Flagship Intl, 793 F.2d 714, 726 (5th Cir. 1986).
27. Snodgrass v. Brown, No. 89-1171-K, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16418, at
*43 (D. Kan. Nov. 26, 1990); Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 549
F. Supp. 1, 16-17 (C.D. Cal. 1980). See also Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d
1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that an '[action taken against an
individual in anticipation of that person engaging in protected opposition to
discrimination" may be retaliatory in nature).
28. Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1997). The court
held that the employee had engaged in protected activity even though, by the
end of the meeting, the employee no longer felt there was an actual
discrimination issue. Id.
29. Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 1994). But see Whatley v.
Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 632 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that assisting another in filing a complaint does not protect an
employee who does not follow instructions from his supervisor or who
performs poorly).
30. Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Little v.
United Tech., 103 F.3d 956, 961 (1997) (holding that a single remark did not
constitute an unlawful employment practice and, therefore, opposition to the
remark did not constitute protected activity).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
32. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). This case involved
an employee who filed a discrimination charge after being fired. Id. at 339.
The former employee claimed that the employer gave a negative reference to a
new prospective employer in retaliation for the discrimination charge. Id.
33. Id. at 346. The Court reached this conclusion after determining that
the word "employees" was ambiguous. Id. at 341. The Court stated that "[tihe
plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the
language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the
broader context of the statute as a whole." Id. at 341 (citing Estate of Cowart
v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500
U.S. 136, 139 (1991)).
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2. Adverse Employment Action
There is currently a great deal of controversy and a circuit
split over what constitutes an adverse employment action.' Some
courts hold that anything short of an "ultimate employment
decision" is not covered by the statute,' while others take a more
liberal view. 36 For instance, in Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.,"
the court defined an adverse employment action as consisting of
"'hiring,
granting
leave,
discharging,
promoting,
and
compensating."'38 In this case, the employee claimed retaliation
after the employer made an unprecedented visit to her home,
demanding she return to work after she became ill with a workrelated illness.39 The employee further claimed that the employer
later reprimanded her for not being at her work station even
though, at the time, she was in the Human Resource Department
discussing the situation, and that the employer reviewed her more
negatively after her EEOC charge than before."° In its ruling, the
court held that the employee had failed to demonstrate a prima
facie case for retaliation as the described events "[did] not
constitute 'adverse employment actions' because of their lack of
consequence." 4" Other courts have taken a similarly narrow view. 42
34. See Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456 (stating that there is a circuit split on
this issue and joining the courts that have held that discrimination includes
more than an ultimate employment decision). See also Linda M. Glover, Title
VII Section 704(a) Retaliation Claims: Turning a Blind Eye Toward Justice, 38
Hous. L. REV. 577, 581 (2001) (proposing a liberal view that claims are
actionable if the employer takes conduct "that chills employee access to the
anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII"). But see Matthew J. Wiles,
Comment, Defining Adverse Employment Action in Title VII Claims for
Employer Retaliation: Determining the Most Appropriate Standard, 27 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 217, 220 (2001) (proposing adoption of a middle-of-the-road
standard which includes only those actions that "materially affect the terms
and conditions" of employment). All courts and the EEOC agree that "petty
slights and trivial annoyances are not actionable .... " EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL, supra note 15, at 8-13.
35. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708.
36. Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998)
(stating that the court decides the issue of adverse employment action on a
case-by-case basis and holding that co-worker hostility, "if sufficiently severe,
may constitute 'adverse employment action' for purposes of a retaliation
claim").
37. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 702.
38. Id. at 707 (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1995)).
The court further stated that "'Title VII was designed to address ultimate
employment decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that
arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.'"
Id. (quoting Dollis, 77 F.3d at 781-82).
39. Id. at 705.
40. Id. at 705-06.
41. Id. at 708.
42. See Burger v. Cent. Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 878 (5th Cir.
1999) (stating that the Fifth Circuit has held to a stricter standard than other
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In contrast, the court in Wideman v. Walmart Stores, Inc.'
held that the "protection against retaliatory discrimination
extends to adverse actions which fall short of ultimate
employment decisions."" In Wideman, the alleged adverse actions
consisted of being improperly listed as a "no show" on a day the
employee was not scheduled to work, being forced to work through
a lunch break and receiving two written reprimands and a
suspension, even though in the previous eleven months of
employment the employer had given the employee no
reprimands.' In addition, the employee alleged that the employer
began to solicit fellow employees for negative comments about her,
one manager threatened her when she stated her intention to call
company headquarters about her treatment and the company
delayed in getting medical treatment for her when she suffered an
allergic reaction at work.' Although the employer claimed that
none of these events were sufficient to rise to the level of adverse
employment actions, the court disagreed, explaining that its ruling
was consistent with the remedial purpose of Title VII. ' The court
noted that allowing employers to take retaliatory action, as long as
it fell short of an ultimate employment action, "could stifle
This
employees' willingness to file charges of discrimination."
more liberal, more encompassing view is held by the majority of
courts."

courts and affirming the ultimate employment decision set forth in Mattern).
See also Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997)
(concluding that "[wihile the action complained of may have had a tangential
effect on her employment, it did not rise to the level of an ultimate
employment decision intended to be actionable under Title VII").
43. 141 F.3d at 1453.
44. Id. at 1456. The court further stated that the position of the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. Id. It
held that "[r]ead in the light of ordinary understanding, the term
'discriminate' is not limited to 'ultimate employment decisions.'" Id.
45. Id. at 1455.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1455-56.
48. Id. at 1456.
49. See Randlett v. Shalala, 118 F.3d 857, 862 (1st Cir. 1997) (rejecting the
"view that a refusal to transfer is automatically outside Title VII"); Knox v.
Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the law does not
provide a specific "laundry list" of actions that may be considered retaliatory
and that allowing harassment by fellow employees after a complainant
engages in protected activity could fall within the category protected by Title
VII); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
that malicious prosecution may constitute an adverse employment action);
Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
transfer of job duties and undeserved below average performance ratings can
constitute adverse employment action if proven). In Ray v. Henderson, the
Ninth Circuit held that "an adverse employment action is adverse treatment
that is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected
activity," including such actions as elimination of employee meetings,
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3. Causation
The third element plaintiffs must prove in their prima facie
case is causation." To prove causation, employer knowledge of the
protected activity is generally required," although it may be
inferred from the circumstances.52 As with the other elements,
there is controversy and a circuit split over the standard necessary
to prove causation."
Some courts take a liberal approach,
requiring only that the protected activity and the adverse
employment action not be "completely unrelated"54 or that the
actions be close in temporal proximity. 5 However, within the area
of temporal proximity, there is no set guideline for how close in
time the two actions must be.5" For example, courts have held that
two days, 57 or even five months,' is close enough to establish
causation while others have held that four months is too long.59
Additionally, some courts extend the time if there are other factors
present, such as "a pattern of antagonism"' or inconsistent
elimination of flexible starting times, institution of a "lockdown", and a
reduction in salary. 217 F.3d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir. 2000). The court, giving a
complete review of the circuit split, noted that the First, Seventh, Tenth,
Eleventh and D.C. Circuits define an adverse employment action broadly. Id.
at 1240. It further explained that the Second and Third Circuits take an
intermediate position, while the Fifth and Eighth Circuits take the most
restrictive views. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the more liberal
standard is appropriate given "the language and purpose of Title VII." Id. at
1243.
50. Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1128 (citing Williams v. Rice, 983 F.2d 177, 181 (10th
Cir. 1993)).
51. Brower v. Runyon, 178 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir. 1999); Dey, 28 F.3d at
1458.
52. Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., No. 02-35615, 2003 WL 22097877, at
*6 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 2003).
53. Rhea Gertken, Note, Causation in Retaliation Claims: Conflict Between
the Prima Facie Case and the Plaintiffs Ultimate Burden of Pretext, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 151, 155 (2003) (citing Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of
Schenectady County, 252 F.3d 545, 554-55 (2d Cir. 2001)).
54. Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1457 (citing Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 15
F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting EEOC v. Reichhold Chems., Inc.,
988 F.2d 1564, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 1993)); Holifteld, 115 F.3d at 1567.
55. Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989). The
Fourth Circuit explained that the plaintiffs proof of causation was essentially
that the employer fired her after it became aware that she had filed a
discrimination charge. Id. The court stated that "[w]hile this proof far from
conclusively establishes the requisite causal connection, it certainly satisfies
the less onerous burden of making a prima facie case of causality." Id.
56. See generally Essary & Friedman, supra note 2, at 143-44 (explaining
that the time frame necessary to show causation can vary from one day to
many months); Gertken, supra note 53, at 155-59 (discussing various court
rulings on temporal proximity in relation to causation).
57. Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989).
58. Gorman-Bakos, 252 F.3d at 555.
59. Cooper v. City of North. Olmsted, 795 F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1986).
60. Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing
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statements given for the adverse employment action.61
Still
others, such as the Fifth Circuit, use a "but for" causation
standard which includes temporal proximity as only one factor to
be considered in the determination.62
C. Third Party Claims
Third party claims present a particular problem in proving a
prima facie case. Title VII states that "[iut shall be unlawful...
for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees...
because he has opposed any practice.., or because he has made a
charge."'
Taken literally, this implies that the person who is
retaliated against must be the same person that opposed an
unlawful practice or participated in a protected activity.6 This
presents a problem in third-party-retaliation claims because the
person who suffers the adverse employment action under the
second element is not the same person who engages in the
protected activity.' Currently, courts are divided over whether to
Robinson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 895 (3d Cir. 1993)).
The district court in the case rejected the plaintiffs claim of retaliation
because she was terminated over a year after engaging in protected activity.
Id. The Third Circuit disagreed, however, finding that the district court erred
in setting its date of the protected activity. Id. at 177-78. Furthermore, the
court stated that temporal proximity is only a basis from which an inference of
causation can be drawn. Id. at 178. It emphasized that to show causation,
courts must look at the evidence as a whole, in light of the particular
circumstances of the case. Id. at 177. The court stated that causation, "which
necessarily involves an inquiry into the motives of an employer, is highly
context-specific" and that an "absence of immediacy between the cause and
effect does not disprove causation." Id. at 178. Finally, the Third Circuit held
that the district court should have made an inquiry to determine if the
'protected activity was the likely reason for [the plaintiffs] termination." Id.
at 179.
61. Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citing Waddell v. Small Tube Prods., Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1986)).
62. Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 43-44 (5th Cir. 1992). In
Shirley, the court found that although fourteen months had passed since the
filing of the EEOC complaint to the employee's termination, the circumstances
of the case established causation. Id. at 42-44. After filing the complaint, the
plaintiff was written up for altering loan records and subsequently suspended
and then terminated, even though in her previous nine years of employment
she had never had any disciplinary problems. Id. at 43. The court disagreed
that the passage of fourteen months was legally conclusive proof of no
retaliation. Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasisadded).
64. Robert J. Gregory, Overcoming Text in an Age of Textualism: A
Practitioner'sGuide to Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation,35 AKRON L.
REV. 451, 484 (2002).
65. Id. There is a compelling argument that the purpose of the statute
would be compromised if an employer were free to retaliate against a relative
or friend of an employee after the employee engages inprotected activity. Id.
However, an attack on the plain meaning of the statute will clearly not work.
Id. at 484-85. Additionally, many judges are unreceptive to arguments based
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interpret the statute according to its literal meaning" or to give it
a more expansive meaning to effectuate the purpose of the
statute.67 If interpreted according to its literal meaning, the
statute provides no protection for retaliation against closelyassociated third parties."
II.

THE DEBATE RAGES: PLAIN MEANING V. PURPOSE OF THE
STATUTE

Courts take two opposing views of interpretation when
deciding the issue of third-party-retaliation claims: plain meaning
and purpose of the statute.69 Because cases under Title VII, the
Americans with Disability Act ("ADA"), 70 and Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA) 71 all tend to be analyzed similarly in
relation to retaliation, 72 courts use cases from all three statutes as
totally on the purpose of the statute. Id. at 485. Therefore, a proponent of
third-party claims must first establish an ambiguity based on the broader
context of the statute and then argue that the term "he" may be broad enough
to cover the case of a spouse or one employee acting for another one. Id. at
485-87. The ambiguity thus created should be resolved in favor of a broad
reading of the statute. Id. at 487.
66. Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1996).
67. De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D.D.C. 1978), affd in
part and rev'd in part,686 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
68. Nalbandian,36 F. Supp. 2d at 1209; Gregory, supra note 64, at 484.
69. Although the views basically fall into two camps, there are several
circuits that have not yet addressed the issue. The Second, Fourth, and Tenth
Circuits are in this group. See Thomas v. Am. Horse Shows Ass'n, Inc., No.
99-7662, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 904, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 2000) (holding that
it had not yet decided the issue of third-party-retaliation claims but affirming
summary judgment on the ground that, even if such a cause of action exists,
the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case); EEOC v. Bojangles Rest.,
Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 326 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (stating that the Fourth Circuit
had not addressed the issue, but finding the decisions of the courts that had
rejected the claim as more persuasive); Horizon Holdings, L.L.C. v. Genmar
Holdings, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1143 (D. Kan. 2002) (noting that the
Tenth Circuit had not had the opportunity to decide the issue). Several
district courts in the second circuit faced this issue recently but resolved the
actions on other grounds. See Reiter v. Metro. Transit Auth., No. 01 Civ. 2762,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18537, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2002) (noting that it
was unnecessary to make a decision regarding third-party claims because no
reasonable juror could find that the plaintiff had actually suffered retaliation);
Sacay v. Research Found. of the City Univ. of N.Y., 193 F. Supp. 2d 611, 634
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that it was unnecessary to resolve third-party
standing because the daughter had raised an issue of material fact that she
had engaged in protected activity in her own right). However, at least one
district court in the second circuit has recognized a cause of action for thirdparty-retaliation claims. Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs. Fishkill
Corr. Facility, 122 F. Supp. 2d 335, 347 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12206.
71. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d).
72. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 567 (citing Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d
494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997)).

2004]

Title VII's Potential Third PartyRetaliation Loophole

1323

precedent in making their decisions. The three statutes are
worded very similarly except that the ADA has a section that has
a broader scope than the other two.73
A. PlainMeaning of the Statute
1.

Fifth Circuit

The Fifth Circuit is one of the circuits taking a firm stance
that a retaliation claim should be interpreted according to the
plain meaning of the statute. Holt v. JTM Industries, Inc.74 is the
seminal case for this view."8 Holt involved a situation where a
husband and wife worked for the same employer." After being
terminated, the wife filed a charge of age discrimination against
the employer." Approximately two weeks after receiving notice of
the complaint, the company placed her husband, a plant manager,
on paid administrative leave and later offered him another job out
of state." The husband then voluntarily quit and brought charges
of retaliation based on his wife's protected activity.79 He made no
claim that he had actually participated in his wife's charges but
instead claimed that her protected activity should be imputed to
him.'
The Fifth Circuit rejected the claim, holding that granting
automatic standing to a spouse for retaliation would be contrary to
the plain language of the ADEA.8 ' Although dismissing the claim,
the Court acknowledged that there was a risk that an employer
might actually retaliate against a spouse, other relative, or even a
friend of the person engaging in protected activity."2 The Court,
however, reasoned that the extra protection would rarely be
necessary because the spouse or other closely-associated person
would, in" most cases, participate in the protected activity "in some
manner. 83
73. 1 JONATHAN R. MooK, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS AND EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS, App. G, §8-I [B](1) (2003).
74. 89 F.3d at 1224.
75. Id. at 1226-27.
76. Id. at 1225.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Holt, 89 F.3d at 1226. The court, however, did not see this as
contradictory to the Sixth Circuit's allowance of a claim for an employee whose
representative had engaged in protected activity on his behalf. Id. at 1227 n.2
(citing Ohio Edison, 7 F.3d at 545). The court reasoned that having someone
act on another employee's behalf satisfied the participation requirement. Id.

82. Id. at 1226-27. The Fifth Circuit further acknowledged that the statute
contained 'broad language" to prevent fear from economic retaliation for
engaging in protected activities. Id.

83. Id. at 1227. The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its requirement of some level
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The dissenting judge expressed strong opposition to the
holding, stating that "[tihe literal meaning of the anti-retaliation
provision should not be used to undermine the clear purpose and
intent of the [statute]."8 The dissent further emphasized that
instead of focusing on whether the company retaliated against the
same person who engaged in protected activity, the focus should be
on the causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action inflicted on the third party."
2. Eighth Circuit
Approximately two years after Holt, the Eighth Circuit
returned a similar ruling in Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc.' In this
case, two employees lived together and management knew of their
relationship."
After the company denied Smith, the female, a
promotion, she filed discrimination charges based on race and
gender under Title VII. Shortly thereafter, the employer accused
Smith of falsifying company records and terminated her. 9 The
company subsequently fired her partner, Thomas, a long-time
employee, for the same reason.' Both parties then brought suits
against the employer, claiming retaliation for Smith's protected
activity.91
of participation in a later Title IX case. Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117
F.3d 242, 251-52 (5th Cir. 1997). The court found the necessary participation
by the plaintiff-coach voicing her opposition to discrimination against female
athletes. Id. at 251.
84. Holt, 89 F.3d at 1231 (Dennis, J., dissenting). The dissent relied on
ADEA § 7(c), which states that "any person aggrieved" may bring an action to
"effectuate the purposes of this Act." Id. at 1228 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
According to the Act, an "aggrieved person" is "'any person who claims to have
been injured by a discriminatory practice.'" Id. at 1228-29 (Dennis, J.,
dissenting). The dissent stated that the circuit had previously construed Title
VII according to the usage in the Fair Housing Act and should do so once
again to give standing a broad application. Id. at 1229 (Dennis, J.,
dissenting).
85. Id. at 1232 (Dennis, J., dissenting). Additionally, courts should modify
the prima facie case for retaliation to read: "(1) that an employee engaged in
activity protected by the ADEA; (2) that an adverse employment action
occurred to the plaintiff; and (3) that a causal link between the participation
in the protected activity and the adverse employment decision exists." Id. at
1233 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
86. 151 F.3d at 813.
87. Id. at 815-16.
88. Id. at 816.
89. Id. at 816-17.
90. Id. at 817. Falsification of records meant there was a discrepancy
between the time employees spent at a computer center and the amount of
time actually spent on the computer. Id. at 816-17. While other employees
had similar discrepancies in their pay records, the company did not terminate
them because, according to the employer, no employee had made statements
implicating them in abuse as they had against Smith and Thomas. Id. at 817.
91. Id.
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The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected Thomas's claim of
retaliation." Although Thomas claimed he had assisted Smith in
her charge, the court concluded that no reasonable jury could find
that the company knew of his assistance; therefore, there was no
causation. 3 Thomas claimed, in the alternative, that even if the
company had no knowledge of his assistance in Smith's activity, he
should have standing based on his relationship as her "significant
other."' The court, relying on Holt, rejected this theory as well
and held that the person bringing a retaliation claim under Title
VII must be the same person who engaged in protected activity.95
3.

Third Circuit

More recently, the Third Circuit took a "plain language"
stance on the third party issue in Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital,
Inc.' In this case, a father and son worked for the same hospital.97
After the hospital gave the father a choice between a demotion and
a voluntary departure, the father left the company and filed age
and disability discrimination charges against the hospital.99 While
the father's suit was pending, the hospital accused the son of
violating company rules and suspended him." The hospital then
fired the son on the same day the father was to be deposed in his
lawsuit against the hospital." As a result, the son brought suit
under the ADA, ADEA, and a Pennsylvania statute, claiming the
hospital fired him in retaliation for his father's protected
activity.''
In reviewing the son's claims, the court looked at the plain
meaning of the statute and found it to be unambiguous in its
meaning that the person who was retaliated against must be the
same person that engaged in protected activity."° The court,

92. Smith, 151 F.3d at 818.
93. Id. at 818-19.
94. Id. at 819.
95. Id.
96. 283 F.3d at 568.
97. Id. at 564.
98. Id. at 565.
99. Id. at 565-66. The son, the Supervisor of Security for the hospital,
entered the hospital gift shop using a spare key, allegedly to check on an
elderly employee. Id. at 566. Even though the son's supervisor testified that
the son had routinely entered the shop to check on the elderly employee, the
hospital, troubled by conflicting information from the elderly employee, found
that the son had violated company rules. Id.
100. Id. It appears that no actual investigation of the incident took place
prior to the decision to terminate the son. Id.
101. Id.
102. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 568. Even though the court ruled according to
the plain meaning of the statute, it stated that there was no doubt that
retaliation against a friend or relative of an employee that had engaged in
protected activity would deter employees from engaging in such activity. Id.
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although acknowledging that recognition of third-party claims
would be "more consistent with the purpose of the antidiscrimination statutes," stated that interpreting according to the
plain meaning did not produce "an absurd outcome that
contravenes the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.""3 The
court further discussed possible, although not "particularly
convincing," reasons why Congress may not have wanted to extend
The reasons
protection to third-party retaliation claims.'
included Congress's possible fear for an increase in frivolous
lawsuits and the fact that friends and relatives may have
participated in filing the charges, thereby negating the need for
additional protection.0 "
The court, although rejecting the son's retaliation claim based
on the ADA, ADEA, and the state statute, held that he did have a
cause of action under the second anti-retaliation provision of the
ADA." This provision states that "[it shall be unlawful to coerce
[or] intimidate... on account of his or her having aided or
encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of,
any right granted or protected by this chapter."017 The court found
that this language did not "limit a cause of action to the particular
employee that engaged in protected activity" and compared the
language to that found in the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"), section 8(a)(1). °8 The court stated that because of its
own precedent," plus that from other circuits, ° in recognizing a
cause of action for close relatives of employees that engage in
protected activity under the NLRA, as well as similar policies
underlying the two statutes, the son could assert a claim under the
second provision of the ADA."

at 568-69.
103. Id. at 569. The District Court of Kansas recently adopted the rationale
of Fogleman. Horizon Holdings, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1144. Like the court in
Fogleman, the Kansas court acknowledged the tension between the plain

meaning of Title VII and the purpose behind the statute. Id. at 1143-44. The
Tenth Circuit, however, has not addressed this issue yet. Id. at 1143.
104. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569.

105. Id. at 569-70.
106. Id. at 570.
107. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b)).

108. Id.
109. Id. The NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice to "'interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees' in exercising their rights guaranteed under the
Act." Id. The court previously held, in an NLRA case, that the firing of a

friend or family member could constitute coercion.

Id. (citing Kenrich

Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 400, 407 (3d Cir. 1990)).
110. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 570. The court noted that the D.C. and Seventh
Circuits also prohibit the firing of a close relative under section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA. Id. (citing Tasty Baking Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 114, 127-28 (D.C. Cir.
2001); NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088-89 (7th Cir. 1987)).

111. Id.
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B. Purpose of the Statute
1.

D.C. DistrictCourt

De Medina v. Reinhardt' 12 was one of the first cases taking the
other point of view in the controversy over recognition of a thirdparty-retaliation claim."' In this case, a woman alleged she was
denied employment in retaliation for her husband's antidiscrimination activities on behalf of minorities." 4 The court
stated that while Congress did not explicitly provide coverage for
third-party claims, it would be against the purpose of the statute
not to do so."' It stated that "[since tolerance of third-party
reprisals would, no less than the tolerance of direct reprisals, deter
persons from exercising their protected rights," the anti-retaliation
provision must proscribe this type of activity against third
parties. The court concluded that to do otherwise would produce
unjust results."7
2. Sixth Circuit
A number of years later, the Sixth Circuit also recognized a
cause of action for retaliation against a third party."8 In EEOC v.
Ohio Edison Co.,"' the employer terminated the employee, then
offered to reinstate him and later withdrew that offer."' The
employee then filed a charge of retaliation, claiming the offer was
withdrawn after a co-worker protested the initial termination. 2 '
The court, relying on De Medina, rejected the employer's argument
that the person being retaliated against must be the same person

112. 444 F. Supp. at 573.
113. Id. at 581.
114. Id. at 574.
115. Id. at 580.
116. Id.
117. Id. The court noted that the husband would not be in a position to seek
back pay or other remedies associated with his wife's situation. Id. Thus, the

"make whole" purpose of the statute would be frustrated if the court did not
recognize a cause of action. Id. In 1999, the D.C. Circuit faced the issue of

third-party claims but rejected the application of the theory on the facts of the
particular case. Milstein v. Henske, 722 A.2d 850, 851 (D.C. 1999). The case
involved an employee who claimed retaliation for a second employee's
protected activity, even though there was no relation or even personal
friendship between the employees. Id. at 854. The court stated that to allow a

third party claim in such a case would "represent an unprecedented
expansion of the definition of'third-party.'" Id. Further, the court stated that
even if it allowed such a broad theory, the plaintiff still failed to show any
causation. Id. at 855.
118. Ohio Edison, 7 F.3d at 545-46.

119. Id. at 541.
120. Id. at 542.
121. Id.
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that engaged in protected activity.1 22 The court stated that
previous holdings in cases involving the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the ADEA gave support to a broad reading of Title VII. 12 It
also relied heavily on the Supreme Court's statement that a
statute "should 'be read more broadly' if such a reading was also
consistent with the 'purpose and objective'" of the statute. 24 The
court, therefore, concluded that the anti-retaliation provision
should be construed broadly
to include an employee or the
25
employee's representative.
3. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit likewise interpreted the retaliation
provision broadly in McDonnell v. Cisneros when a supervisor
claimed his employer retaliated against him because he did not
discourage or prevent other employees from filing discrimination
charges.' 6 The court, acknowledging that such a claim did not
come within a literal reading of Title VII, nevertheless, found that
it was error to dismiss the complaint.'2
It explained that the
probable reason Congress had not explicitly included third-party
protection was that, generally, an employer has no reason to
retaliate against a third party.'2 While the court was careful to
limit the extension of the statute to two types of situations
apparently unforeseen by Congress (the current situation and
"collective punishment"),"9 it stated that "no great violence" had
been done to the statute by deviating from the literal reading
to
130
effectuate its purpose in preventing "genuine retaliation."
122. Id. at 543-44. In a later case, the Sixth Circuit quoted the EEOC's
liberal stance regarding allowance of third-party claims with approval.
Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 580 (6th Cir. 2000).
123. Ohio Edison, 7 F.3d at 544.
124. Id. at 545 (quoting NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972)).
125. Id. at 545-46. The court stated that on remand, the plaintiff would
have to show causation, the third element of a retaliation claim. Id. at 546.
Otherwise, it commented, any time an employer took an adverse employment
action against an employee, the employer would open himself up to retaliation
claims if someone else was engaging in protected activity at the same time.
Id. The Fourth Circuit cited this case with approval in Baird v. Rose, a case
where a mother engaged in protected activity on behalf of her daughter. 192
F.3d 462, 471 n.10 (4th Cir. 1999).
126. Id. at 262.
127. Id,
128. Id.
129. Id.
The court stated the two situations are: (1) where there is
"collective punishment" against several employees because the employer does
not know who filed the charge; and (2) where an employer retaliates against
an employee for not preventing another from engaging in protected activity.

Id.
130. Id. The court commented that Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.
1989), was even more liberal in its interpretation of Title VII. McDonnell, 84
F.3d at 262 (referencing Wu, 863 F.2d at 1547-48). In the Wu case, both the
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4. District Court of California
The District Court for the Eastern District of California also
interprets Title VII broadly to encompass third party retaliation
claims in order to effectuate the purpose of the statute. 3' In
EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc.,' 3 the company regularly
employed the plaintiff as a seasonal employee."
After the
plaintiffs sister, also an employee, brought charges of
discrimination against the company, the employer refused to
rehire the plaintiff."
The plaintiff then brought charges of
the
refusal was a result of his sister's
retaliation, claiming
35
protected activity.'
The court found the statutory language of Title VII to be
ambiguous and, therefore, looked at the purpose of the statute. 36
It determined that a narrow "interpretation would chill employees
from exercising their Title VII rights ... out of fear that their
protected activity could adversely jeopardize the employment
status of a friend or relative." 37 The court, in reaching its
conclusion that third parties may state a claim for retaliation,

husband and wife worked for the same university. 863 F.2d at 1545. After the
wife brought charges of gender discrimination, the university, without
explanation, removed the husband from his position as chairman of the
department and advised him to look for a new position. Id. The wife then
filed a second charge, claiming that the university had retaliated against her
husband in response to her protected activities. Id. The district court found
that the husband had no cause of action for retaliation because he had not
filed a separate EEOC complaint. Id. at 1547. The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
finding that the husband's claim was properly before the court even though he
had not made an independent charge. Id. at 1548.
131. Nalbandian, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1211. Numerous other district courts
have interpreted Title VII to include third-party-retaliation claims. See
Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1108, 1118
(W.D.N.Y. 1996) (focusing on the causal relationship, the court held that a
husband had a cause of action for retaliation as a result of his wife's charges of
discrimination under Title VII); Thurman v. Robertshaw Control Co., 869 F.
Supp. 934, 941 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (stating that in the case of retaliation against a
close relative of a co-employee who participates in a protected activity, "the
first element of the prima facie case is modified to require the plaintiff to show
that the relative was engaged in statutorily protected expression"); Mandia v.
Arco Chem. Co., 618 F. Supp. 1248, 1250 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (finding that Title
VII prohibits retaliation against close relatives of employees that engage in
protected activity).
132. 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
133. Id. at 1207-08.
134. Id. at 1208.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1209-10. The court found that the primary purpose of Title VII's
retaliation provision was to provide "unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms." Id. at 1210 (citing Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. at 346).
137. Id. The court further explained that denying a third-party claim would
allow an employer to do indirectly what he is prohibited from doing directly.
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gave strong weight to the fact that other courts routinely interpret
Title VII and related statutes broadly'38 and that the EEOC
recognizes third-party actions.' 9

III. A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE RETALIATION PROVISION IS
NECESSARY TO END DISCRIMINATION

Courts must interpret the retaliation provision of Title VII
broadly to include third-party claims in order to serve the purpose
of providing "unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms." 4 ' Otherwise, without this protection, employers can
effectively prevent employees from exercising their rights under
the statute for fear of retaliation against a close friend or
relative. 4 '
A. Support for a Broad Interpretation
There is much support for interpreting Title VII broadly. 4'
Not only is there precedent from the courts that currently
recognize third-party claims, but there is also precedent from the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII in other contexts,43

138. Nalbandian,36 F. Supp. 2d at 1211-12.
139. Id. at 1211. The EEOC has long recognized third-party-retaliation
claims. Evangeline Z. Bates, No. 01963655, 1997 WL 332902, at *1 (EEOC
App. June 10, 1997). The EEOC Compliance Manual specifically recognizes
this cause of action. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 15, at 8-9, 8-10.
140. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. at 346. According to the Supreme Court, "[iut is
a well-established canon of statutory construction that a court should go
beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language would
defeat the plain purpose of the statute." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 586 (1983).
141. Nalbandian, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1210 (citing Clark v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., No. 79-7, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11679, at *19 (E.D. La. Feb. 2,
1982)); De Medina, 444 F. Supp. at 580.
142. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 381 (1977)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that "Title
VII is a remedial statute designed to eradicate certain invidious employment
practices" and that the "Act should 'be given a liberal interpretation'"); Moyo,
40 F.3d at 985 (stating that Title VII is a remedial statute and has long been
interpreted broadly); Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d at 726 (noting that "the
provisions of Title VII must be construed broadly in order to give effect to
Congress' intent in eliminating invidious employment practices").
143. An example of how the courts construe Title VII broadly is their
generosity in allowing a prevailing plaintiff to collect attorney's fees while
See
generally failing to award such fees to a prevailing defendant.
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978) (holding that
the equitable considerations that favor granting awards of attorney fees to
prevailing plaintiffs are absent in the case of a prevailing defendant); Sobel v.
Yeshiva Univ., 619 F. Supp. 839, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that "the
standard for awarding fees to prevailing plaintiffs is very generous" while the
burden on a prevailing defendant is "significantly greater" due to the policy of
encouraging legitimate claims).
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such as sexual harassment.'" For example, the Court extended
coverage for hostile work environment to include a situation where
the employee suffered no actual psychological injury. 4' It held
that an individual may recover without showing that she suffered
a tangible employment action" or that the employer was negligent
or at fault. The Court also extended coverage to harassment by
members of the same sex. 1" In doing so, the Court stated that
Title VII should not be construed narrowly because it "'evinces a
congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women in employment.'"1"
The EEOC also provides support to recognition of third-party
claims, stating that "[iut is well settled that third party reprisals
are cognizable under EEO law.""'
The agency specifically
recognizes that the person claiming retaliation need not be the
same person who participated in protected activity' or who
144. See Christopher M. O'Connor, Note, Stop HarassingHer or We'll Both
Sue: Bystander Injury Sexual Harassment, 50 CASE W. REs. L. REv 501, 51516 (1999) (reviewing relevant case law in relation to bystander injury for
sexual harassment).
145. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). The Court defined a
hostile work environment as one in which a reasonable person would perceive
the environment to be hostile or abusive. Id. The courts were previously
divided as to whether the conduct had to cause actual injury or "seriously
affect [an employee's] psychological well-being" before a plaintiff could
recover. Id. at 20.
146. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). "A tangible
employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status,
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits." Id. at 761. It generally "inflicts direct economic harm." Id. at 762.
147. Id. at 765. The employer may claim an affirmative defense, that it used
reasonable care in preventing harassment and that the plaintiff failed to take
advantage of available corrective measures, when the employee suffers no
tangible employment action. Id. Prior to this case and a companion decision
the same year, courts were split as to when to hold an employer liable for the
acts of supervisors. Ann M. Henry, Comment, Employer and Employee
Reasonableness Regarding Retaliation Under the EllerthIFaragher
Affirmative Defense, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 553, 555 (1999).
148. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). The male
plaintiff in the case brought charges of sexual harassment after fellow crew
members on an oil platform subjected him to sex-related humiliating actions
and threatened to rape him. Id. at 77. The Court, while noting that sexual
harassment of one male by another was certainly "not the principal evil
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII[, ... statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils." Id. at 79.
149. Id. at 78 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64
(1986)). The Court had previously rejected the presumption that an employer
would not discriminate against an employee of the same race. Id.
150. Pamela G. Alexander, No. 01975380, 1998 WL 201692, at *4 (EEOC
App. April 16, 1998).
151. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 15, at 8-10.
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engaged in opposition."' Further, the EEOC Compliance Manual
states that Title VII "prohibit[s] retaliation against someone so
closely related to or associated with the person exercising his or
her statutory rights that it would discourage that person from
pursuing those rights. 53
The strongest argument for a broad interpretation of Title VII
comes from the Supreme Court's ruling in Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co., ' where it held that former employees are covered by the antiretaliation provision. ' The Supreme Court found that to read the
statute narrowly would effectively eliminate coverage for
employment discharge retaliation, a consequence contrary to the
purpose of the statute.51 6 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
relied heavily on the EEOC's position that to disallow claims by
former employees would allow "an employer to be able to retaliate
with impunity against" terminated employees." 7
The Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.," stated
that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII "is entitled to great
deference" by the courts."9
Thus, just as the Supreme Court
showed deference to the EEOC's interpretation of the term
"employees" in Shell Oil Co.,"6 courts should show a similar
deference to the EEOC's interpretation of the retaliation clause by
recognition of third-party claims.
B. A BroaderDefinition Would Increase Consistency
There is currently a great deal of variance in how courts
handle third-party-retaliation claims. Some courts allow the
claims to proceed while others do not. Still other courts use a
broad interpretation of other aspects of the retaliation provision to
provide coverage. For example, a district court recently rejected
coverage for a third-party plaintiff due to a plain language
reading, but nevertheless found coverage under the statute by
interpreting the participation clause broadly.'
The court stated
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 8-9.
Id.
519 U.S. at 337.
Id. at 346.

156. Id. The Court, after finding that the term "employees" was ambiguous,
held that including former employees within the definition was "more
consistent with the broader context of Title VII and the primary purpose" of

the section. Id.
157. Id. The EEOC argued that the possibility of post-employment
retaliation would not only deter an employee from making a complaint but
"would provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might

bring Title VII claims." Id.
158. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

159. Id. at 434.
160. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. at 346.
161. Bojangles Rest., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 327-28. The case involved a
situation in which the employer denied the female the opportunity to return to
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that assistance included "voluntary or involuntary support" and
that "assistance may, but need not, be actual assistance so long as
it is proven that the employer perceives that assistance was or will
be given."162
While this "middle of the road" approach does represent a
compromise between the plain language and purpose of the statute
positions, it simply encourages the courts and plaintiffs to stretch
meanings and begs the question of what constitutes participation
in any manner."" Is simply providing emotional support to the
person engaging in protected activity enough or is driving the
relative or close friend to the local EEOC office required?" Where
does one draw the line?
Not only does denial of third-party claims lead to inconsistent
results among courts but it also leads to inconsistent results in the
protection available from the various employment-related statutes.
Courts treat cases under Title VII, the ADA and the ADEA
similarly and use cases from one statute in analyzing a case under
another statute.'6 Yet, the ADA contains a section that courts
interpret broadly to allow claims by third parties.66 The same is
true for the NLRA.'67
It makes little sense to think that Congress would provide
additional protection under other statutes but stop short of
providing complete protection for retaliation claims brought under
Title VII. This is particularly true given that Congress's intent in
passing Title VII was to end discrimination in employment."6
M

work, following a pregnancy leave, after her fiancee threatened to bring
discrimination charges against their employer. Id. at 324-25. The employer
knew that the fianc6e was the father of the child and that the two employees
lived together. Id. at 324. The court, while not recognizing a third-party
claim, found that Title VII already provides adequate protection to the

plaintiff "by construing the existing language in a natural, unstrained fashion,
albeit broadly, as is consistent with the remedial purpose of Title VII." Id. at
327. (citing Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir.

1970)).
162. Id. at 329.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
164. Bojangles Rest., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 329. (citing Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d
1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981), a case not involving a Title VII claim, where the
Eleventh Circuit defined "assisted" to include accompanying a spouse to an
attorney's office and providing undefined help).
165. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 567.

166. Id. at 570.
167. Id.
168. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (stating that

the purpose of Title VII is "the elimination of discrimination in the
workplace"); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)
(explaining that the purpose of Title VII is to make employers examine their
work practices in an effort to eliminate discrimination); McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 800 (noting that the "language of Title VII makes plain the
purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to
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More likely, as the Seventh Circuit stated, Congress did not
provide for retaliation because employers generally have no reason
to retaliate against third parties.16 While it is maybe uncommon
170
for members of the same family to work for the same employer,
such situations nevertheless exist, and these people need the
protection of Title VII as much as any other employee if they are to
feel free to voice their complaints or concerns about discriminatory
activity. Thus, recognizing third-party claims would not only
serve the purpose of the statute but would increase consistency in
decisions among the various courts and increase consistency in the
protection provided by the various employment-related statutes.
Many of the courts that do not extend coverage for third-party
claims explain their decisions by stating that, while it would be
more consistent with the aims of Title VII, the extra protection for
a family member or other closely associated person is rarely
However, as
needed due to the participation clause. 7'
demonstrated by the cases, not all third-party plaintiffs claim
participation, but may nevertheless suffer the consequences of an
adverse employment action because of their association with a
person who engaged in protected activity or because the employer
1 72
feared or suspected that they had participated in the activity.
Moreover, retaliation in such situations may be all the more
devastating because the employer's discriminatory actions
negatively impact two people, not just one.
While there is admittedly some danger of an increase in
frivolous lawsuits, this can be kept to a minimum by looking
carefully at causation.'73 None of the courts that have allowed
third-party claims suggest that coverage should be extended to the

eliminate... discriminatory practices").
169. McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 262.

170. See Holt, 89 F.3d at 1232 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (noting that situations
in which family members work for the same employer do not happen
frequently).
171. See id. at 1227 (stating that in most cases relatives or friends
participate in the charge in some manner); Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569

(explaining that while recognition of third-party claims would be more
consistent with the purpose of the statute, Congress possibly did not extend
protection to third parties because they may have participated in filing the
charge).

172. See supra discussion Part II (stressing that a situation sometimes
occurs in which the third-party plaintiff did not encourage or participate in the
protected activity).
173. See Ohio Edison, 7 F.3d at 546 (stating that the third-party plaintiff
must show a causal connection to prevent the absurd situation where anytime
an employer takes an adverse action against one employee, another employee
that has engaged in protected activity may bring a claim of retaliation); Holt,

89 F.3d at 1232 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the focus should not
be on standing but on causation).
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174
Courts should
"bare relationship of co-employees" without more.
recognize third-party claims but give the plaintiff no special
treatment and require the third party to meet all of the normal
requirements of a retaliation claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

Although courts need to be concerned about the possibility of
frivolous lawsuits keeping employers from conducting their
businesses and bogging down the judicial system, valid retaliation
claims by third parties should be allowed in all circuits to fill a
loophole in the current law and to provide consistency throughout
the judicial system. Courts should modify the elements of the
prima facie case to reflect this improved protection for third
parties, but still require the plaintiff to meet all other
requirements, including causation. Recognition of third-party
claims will allow employees to exercise their rights to report
discrimination and put employers on notice that no retaliation is
permissible, thus serving the purpose of Title VII.

174. Millstein, 722 A.2d at 854. See also O'Connell v. Isocor Corp., 56 F.
Supp. 2d 649, 654 (E.D. Va. 1999) (stating that while the court had recognized
standing for third-party-retaliation claims, it only did so in cases of closelyassociated persons, not just "two people whose only connection is that they
happened to work for the same company").

